Evolutionary Ethics :: Morals Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Evolutionary EthicsABSTRACT Michael cheat has argued that evolutionary ethics discredits the objectivity and foundations of ethics. Ruse must affiance dubitable assumptions, however, to reach his conclusion. We can trace these assumptions to G. E. Moore. Also, part of Ruses case against the foundations of ethics can support the objectivity and foundations of ethics. Cooperative activity adapt toward human flourishing helps point the way to a naturalistic good realism and not exclusively to ethical skepticism as Ruse supposes. opening Ruses Metaethical AssumptionsMichael Ruse has argued that evolutionary ethics discredits the objectivity and foundations of ethics (Ruse 1991, Ruse 1993). Ruse must employ dubitable assumptions, however, to reach his conclusion. Also, parts of Ruses case against the foundations of ethics can support the objectivity and foundations of ethics. Ruses narrow construal of the foundations of ethics plays an important role in his arguments against the foun dations of ethics. He considers notwithstanding 3 possible contenders that could serve as foundations for ethics 1) Moorean non-naturalism, 2) Platonic Forms, and 3) the Divine Command Theory (Ruse 1993 157). For Ruse, each of the three contenders explains how honourableity can refer to something step up there(Ruse 1993 153, 158). Notice that for Ruse one can only maintain the position of moral realismthe view that at least some moral issues are objective and obtain independently of our moral beliefsnon-naturalistic entirelyy. His reasoning for this is clear. He points out that Moores arguments against the evolutionary ethics of Herbert Spencer turned on the is/ought distinction. According to this distinction, we cannot logically ground ethical statements naturalistically, for one cannot derive ought from is. Moores arguments against ethical naturalismthe view that moral claims/facts/judgments are nothing but a special secern of natural claims/facts/judgmentshelp make Moores cas e in favor of non-naturalism. Platos non-natural Forms and the commands of a non-natural divinity would also avoid the difficult task of deriving values from natural, physical facts that ethical naturalism faces. Philosophers (not least of all Ruse) commonly proclaim that Moores application of the naturalistic fallacy hinges on the is/ought distinction. For Moore, we cannot derive moral statements from non-moral statements because good is indefinable, or, as Prof. Sidgwick says, an unanalysable notion (Moore 1903 17). This would imply of course that any attempt whatsoever to define or analyze a moral term much(prenominal) as good in other terms is fallacious. Moore concedes that we can analyze moral words in terms of each other but all reductions of moral terms will ultimately reduce to good and bad.